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THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION I
ALAN J. AUERBACH *
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981' (ERTA) included several
significant changes in the tax law that together represented the most substantial
cut in corporate and personal income taxes ever. A particularly important
and controversial element of ERTA — the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System 2
 (ACRS) — introduced radical changes in business depreciation
practices.' ACRS substantially reduced tax lifetimes and decreased the
number of distinct depreciation classes from well over one hundred' to only
t Copyright 1982, Boston College Law Review.
* Associate Professor of Economics, Harvard University; Research Associate, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research; A.B. Yale University 1974, Ph.D. Harvard University
1978. I am grateful to Alvin C. Warren and Stanley S. Surrey for helpful comments.
I Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981),
2 I.R.C. 168 (West Supp. 1982).
3
 After the writing of this paper, a number of amendments to ACRS were made by the
enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982. Pub. L. No.
97-248, 51 U.S.L.W. 5 (1982). In particular, the additional liberalization of depreciation allow-
ances (discussed below in section two) scheduled to begin in 1985 was rescinded, (Id. at 5 206) a
50% adjustment to an asset's taxable basis for the value of investment credits received was intro-
duced, (Id. at 5 205) and safe-harbor leasing (discussed below in section five) was scheduled for a
complete phase out by the end of 1983 and made less attractive in the interim by a series of
measures. Id. at 55 208, 209. These included restricting to 50% the current tax liability that a
lessor could offset with safe-harbor leases, prohibiting the carrying back of tax losses generated by
safe-harbor leasing, limiting to 45% the fraction of an investor's qualified lease property that
could be included in safe-harbor leases, calling for a larger capital recovery period and gradual
receipt of the investment tax credit on property involved in such leases, and restricting the term
and interest rate of the lease. Id. at 5 208.
These changes all are important, though of course, further changes in law could occur
before many of them take effect. Though analysis of the new law is beyond the scope of this
paper, certain of the conclusions made below should be seen as applying only to the law as it
stood before the passage of TEFRA.
4
 The reference is to the asset depreciation range (ADR) system. ADR was initially in-
troduced by the Treasury Department by administration action in June 1971. See T.D. 7128,
1971-2 C.B. 132 (creating Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11). The ADR system created various depre-
ciation write-off periods for various classes of depreciable assets. See id. at 1.167(a)(11)(b)(4)
(1982). Congress codified the ADR option in the Revenue Act of 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-178,
5 109, 85 Stat. 497, 508-509 (1971), creating an I.R.C. 5 167(m) (1976). The Act altered the
Treasury's original composition of ADR, see T.D. 7128, 1971-1 C.B. 132, 140-41, by replacing
the first year convention originally included by the Treasury with a half-year convention. See
I,R.C. 5 167(m)(2) (1976); see also H.R. REP. No. 533, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 reprinted in 1971
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1825, 1829-30. Taxpayers were required to make an annual
election in order to use ADR. I.R.C. 167(m)(3) (1976). The Treasury's original list of asset
guideline classes for ADR was contained in Rev. Proc. 71-25, 1971-2 C.B. 553. The last com-
prehensive listing of asset guideline classes promulgated by the Treasury before the enactment of
ERTA is contained in Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-1 C.B. 548. Subsequent modifications of Rev.
Proc. 77-10 are catalogued in 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 17320.08.
The enactment in ERTA of ACRS made the use of ADR for taking depreciation
1327
1328	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1327
three.' In addition, ERTA liberalized the investment tax credit 6 and created a
"safe harbor" for a broad class of leasing arrangements to permit firms
without taxable income effectively to sell their depreciation allowances and in-
vestment credits to corporations with taxable income.' This acceleration of
depreciation allowances and the related business incentive provisions are likely
to have important consequences for the mix and level of investment in the
United States over the next several years.
The changes introduced by ERTA, which are to be fully phased in by the
end of 1985, 8
 are expected ultimately to produce a large revenue loss to the
Treasury. Estimates of this projected loss vary from $54.5 billion 9 to $61.3
billion'° for fiscal year 1986. In comparison, the total collection of the corporate
income tax amounted to $64.6 billion in 1980." ERTA, therefore, appears to
reduce significantly the corporate income tax as a source of revenue. While this
observation may be true in the aggregate, however, significant differences re-
main, and others have been introduced, in the tax treatment of various in-
vestments and investors that would not have existed had the corporate tax
simply been phased out.
The purpose of this article is to provide an economist's perspective on the
new depreciation system introduced by ERTA, and the other business incen-
tive provisions the Act contains. The article will examine those provisions in
light of prior investment incentives and alternative proposals which were
presented prior to the adoption of ACRS. In so doing, it will describe the
mechanics of the various provisions. The article also will evaluate ACRS with
respect to various criteria used by economists in analyzing the efficiency of in-
vestment incentives.
allowance on depreciable assets placed in service after December 31, 1980, (see I.R.C. 168(e)(1)
(West Supp. 1982)) largely obsolete. ADR is no longer available for property placed in service
after December 31, 1980 if that property fits within the definition (contained in I.R.C. 5 168(c)
(West Supp. 1982)) of "recovery property." See also infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
3
 Under ACRS, most depreciable business property falls into rapid write-off period
classes of three, five, or ten years. See I.R.C. 5 168(c)(2)(A); (B); (C). See infra notes 37, 40, and
accompanying text. There are two additional classes possessing a fifteen year write-off period for
certain real property (section 1250 property) and for public utility property. I.R.C.
168(c)(2)(D); (E). See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
See Pub. L. No. 97-34, §5 211-14, 95 Stat. 172, 227:241 (1980), amending I.R.C.
§5 46-48 (West Supp. 1982).
I.R.C.	 168(f)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
B The maximum rapid write-off benefits under ACRS take effect for property placed
in service after December 31, 1985. Compare I.R.C. 168(b)(1)(A) and (B) (West Supp. 1982)
with I.R.C. 168(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1982).
9
 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1st Sess., SUM-
MARY OF H,R. 4242, THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 57. (Comm, Print
1981).
1 ° U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, CHANGE IN
FISCAL YEAR RECEIPTS RESULTING FROM THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON H .R . 4242, THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, August 3, 1981, at B-1.
" U.S. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,
1981 Table B-70, at 315. This report, prepared before the enactment of ACRS in ERTA,
estimated that revenues from the corporate income tax would be approximately the same
amount. Id.
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After reviewing the history of investment incentives in the United States
in Section One, this article in Section Two examines ERTA as it relates to
depreciation. Section Three presents a comparison of ACRS with alternatives
that arose during the policy discussion leading to the passage of ERTA. Section
Four reviews the criteria economists use in evaluating changes in the tax treat-
ment of investment. Section Five presents an economic analysis of ACRS, and
also touches on the relative merits of some of the other recent proposals alluded
to above. In addition, Section Five reviews in detail a particularly important
part of ACRS — the liberalization of sale-leaseback arrangements. The last
section, Six, offers some concluding comments on the state of the corporate in-
come tax.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN THE U.S.
The business incentive provisions in ERTA were only one set in a series of
changes in the tax law affecting business investment through depreciation
allowances, the investment tax credit and the corporate tax rate.
The initial enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954' 2 included the
first major change in the tax law aimed specifically at encouraging business in-
vestment. This change afforded purchasers of depreciable assets a choice of two
forms of "accelerated" depreciation for tax purposes as alternatives to the nor-
mal practice of the time — straight-line depreciation based on the theoretical
useful life of the asset." The two new formulas for accelerated depreciation
were the sum of the years-digits method" and the declining balance method.' 5
Both methods permit a large fraction of an asset's depreciation deductions to be
taken in the years shortly after its acquisition. This shifting of deductions
toward earlier years is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the Treasury to
the purchaser of the asset, since it allows the purchaser to defer tax payments to
later years with no increase in the amount due.' 6
Other major changes in depreciation allowances before 1981 were enacted
in 1962 and 1971. In 1962, the Treasury Department introduced depreciation
guidelines" which permitted investors to write off assets over a shorter period
12 Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
" See I.R.C.	 23(1) (1952). (Note that reference here is to the 1939 Code.) I.R.C.
S 167(b)(1) (1976); Treas. Reg. S 1.167(6)-1 (1982).
14 I.R.C. S 167(b)(3) (1976); Treas. Reg. S 1.167(b)-3 (1982).
15 I.R.C. S 167(b)(2) (1976); Treas. Reg. $ 1-167(b)-2 (1982).
16 See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 401 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SURREY, WARREN, MCDANIEL & AULT]. For example, an
asset with a two-year lifetime purchased for $100 would receive straight-line deductions of $50,
amounting to tax savings (based on the corporate rate of 46%, see I.R.C. S 11(b)(5) (West Supp.
1982)) of $23 in each year. The sum-of-the-years digits method would dictate a deduction of
$66.67 in the first year, and $33.33 the second (see Treas. Reg. S 1.167(b)-3(a)(2)(ii) (1982)) with
equivalent tax savings of $30.67 and $15.33 respectively. The total tax savings is still $46, but the
investor receives $7.67 more in the first year and $7.67 less in the second year.
See Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418.
1330	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1327
than typically had been allowed before." The Revenue Act of 1971 19 created
the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system," under which the purchaser of a
qualifying asset was permitted to select a tax lifetime of between 80 and 120%
of the asset guideline period established under ADR for the appropriate asset
class. 21
 The variation in lifetimes under the ADR system applied to personal
(Section 1245) property (equipment), 22 but not depreciable real (Section 1220)
property (structures)."
The second major element of the tax system having a direct and narrow
impact on investment is the investment tax credit (ITC). Introduced in the
Revenue Act of 1962 24
 as a 7% credit on new investment," it was suspended
for a brief period between 1966 and 1967, 26
 "permanently" removed in
1969, 27
 reintroduced in 1971, 28
 and increased to a 10% credit in the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975. 29
 Like the Asset Depreciation Range, the ITC did not
(and still does not) apply to depreciable real property," and applied at reduced
rates for short-lived equipment with tax lives of less than seven years. 3 '
18
 Rev. Proc. 62-21 established guideline write-off periods for various types of business
assets. See id. at 419-28. These periods represented the Treasury's estimates of the useful lives of
the various asset classes. See id. at 419-28. These periods represented the Treasury's estimates of
the useful lives of the various asset classes. See id. at 429. Rev. Proc. 62-21 contained procedures
to be used in selecting a write-off period for an asset which was shorter lived than the prescribed
guideline period. Id. at 431-34.
m Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
20 See supra note 4.
I.R.C. 5 167(m)(1) (1976). ADR has been largely repealed by ERTA. See supra
22 See Treas. Reg. S 1.167(a)-(11)(b)(2)(iii)(a) (1982).
23 See id. at 5 1.167(a)-(11)(b)(2)(iii)(b) (1982).
The election of ADR made tax accounting more complicated for the investor. Such
complexity has been offered as one explanation for the fact that many smaller businesses failed to
adopt ADR, even several years after its introduction. See T. VASQUEZ, OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE EFFECTS OF THE ASSET DEPRECIATION
RANGE SYSTEM ON DEPRECIATION PRACTICE, PAPER NO. 1, 21 (1974).
24
 Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
25 Id. at 5 2(b), 76 Stat. 960, 963 (1962) (creating I.R.C. S 46(a)(1) (1964)).
26 See Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508 (1966) (creating I.R.C. S 48(b), (i), (j) (1964
ed. Supp. V 1964-1969)). Congress created a "suspension period" for the investment credit run-
ning from October 10, 1966 to December 31, 1967. See Pub. L. No. 89-800, 5 1, 80 Stat. 1508,
1513 (1966).
" Pub. L. No. 91-172, 5 703, 83 Stat. 487, 660 (1969) (creating I.R.C. S 49 (1970);
repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-600, 5 312(c)(1), (d), 92 Stat. 2826 (1978)).
28
 Pub. L. No. 92-179, 5 101(a), 85 Stat. 497, 498 (1971).
29
 Pub. L. No. 94-12, 5 301, 89 Stat. 2636 (1975); see I.R.C. 5 46(a)(2)(A) (1976).
" See I.R.C. S 48(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
31
 Under I.R.C. 5 46, the taxpayer was allowed a 10% credit on the "qualified invest-
ment" amount for the property. See I.R.C. 5 46(a)(2)(A) (1976). The "qualified investment"
amount was defined as the full amount of the cost basis of the property if the property had a
useful life of at least seven years, two-thirds of that basis if the useful life was five to six years, and
one third of that basis if the useful life was three to four years. See id. S 46(c)(2) (1976). Property
with a useful life of less than three years did not have a qualified investment amount and was
therefore ineligible for the credit. This last feature of the ITC constituted the main reason a busi-
ness would have for using ADR to elect a tax lifetime of at least seven years in order to receive the
full 10% credit.
note 4.
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More generally, while not limited to income from investment, tax rate
reductions, especially in the corporate sector, also have been viewed as a way of
stimulating investment activity. Except for a 10% surcharge imposed during
the Viet, Nam War," the corporate tax has drifted downward during the last
two decades, with a reduction to 48% from 52% in 1964" and a further reduc-
tion to 46% in 1978. 34
Econometric evidence varies on the degree of investment stimulus pro-
vided by each of these three changes in the tax law." Nonetheless there is
general agreement among economists that tax incentives do influence the scale
and type of investment that occurs. 36
 Indeed, one might argue the formulation
and adoption in ERTA of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System grew in part
from a general perception that not enough investment in plant and equipment
was taking place.
II. THE ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM
The key aspect of ACRS is the shortening and simplification of deprecia-
tion schedules applicable to personal and real property. For example, effective
January 1, 1981, 3 ' most new personal (section 1245) property qualifies for one
of two depreciation classes. Autos, light-duty trucks, and other personal prop-
erty with a midpoint life of four years or less under the old ADR system"
qualify for a three-year write-off." Most other equipment may be depreciated
" Pub. L. No. 90-364, 5 102(a), 82 Stat. 251, 254 (1968); see LR.C. S 51(a)(1)(B)
(1970).
33 The Revenue Act of 1964 reduced the corporate tax rate by lowering the "normal
tax" on corporate income from 30% to 22%, and raising the surtax amount from 22% to 26%.
See Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19, 25 (1964); see also I.R.C. 5 11(b), (C) (1970).
34 The Revenue Act of 1978 eliminated the application of a separate "normal tax" and
"surtax" to corporate income and replaced it with a single, graduated schedule of tax rates for
corporations with the maximum rate set of 46%. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 5 301(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2820 (1978); see I.R.C. 11(b) (1976 ed. Supp. III 1979).
" See supra note 123.
36 See id.
	37  See I.R.C.	 168(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982); see also id.	 168(e)(1).
38 Under ADR different classes of assets (termed "asset guideline class(es)") were
assigned to various write-off periods. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977 - 1 C.B. 548. Each asset
guideline class was assigned an "asset guideline period" equal to the number of years over which
the asset was to be depreciated. See id. There was also an upper limit and lower limit (equal to the
asset guideline period plus or minus 20% of that period), allowing the taxpayer to select a longer
or shorter depreciation lifetime for an asset. See id. The central period, the asset guideline period,
was known as the ADR "midpoint" life of the asset. Under ADR., the midpoint life of automo-
biles (asset guideline class 00.22) was three years (id. at 550), and the midpoint life of light
general purpose trucks (asset guideline class 00.242) was four years. Id.
39 Under ACRS, an asset with a midpoint life of 4 years or less is placed into the three-
year rapid recovery property class. See I.R.C. 5 168(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1982). That section
states that three-year property includes 5 1245 class property with "a present class life" of 4 years
or less. Id. Present class life is defined as the asset guideline period (the ADR midpoint life) for
the asset as determined under ADR. See id. 168(g)(2). Thus, although ERTA repeals ADR as a
method for depreciation, ADR is retained insofar as an asset's ADR midpoint lifetime continues
to be relevant in determining which write-off period applies under ACRS. See id. S 168(c); see also
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over five years." Real (section 1250) property is assigned to a fifteen-year
recovery period.¢"
The new legislation also specifies the pattern of depreciation allowance to
be used for each of the three recovery classes which are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Recovery Schedules under ACRS42
Class
Year of Purchase
% Allowance in Year 1981-4
3 Year
1985 1986
5 year
1981-4	 1985 1986
1 25% 29% 33% 15% 18% 20%
2 38 47 45 22 33 32
3 37 24 22 21 25 24
4 21 16 16
5 21 8 8
For personal property placed in service between 1981 and 1984, the allowances
set forth in the Act mimic the use of 150%, declining balance with a switch-
over to straight-line in the later years and adoption of the half-year conven-
tion," under which all assets purchased in a given tax year are treated as if they
were purchased six months into the year." For 1985, the schedule for new per-
sonal property approximates 175% declining balance with a second-year
switchover to sum-of-the-year's digits." For 1986 and after, the pattern of
allowances follows 200% declining balance with a second-year switchover to
sum-of-the-year's digits."
S. REP. NO. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49.50, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
105, 154-55. Hence, because automobiles, light-duty trucks and all other assets having an ADR
midpoint life of four years or less, under ACRS such assets are placed into the three year
recovery period.
" See I.R.C. S 168(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1982). The five-year property class under
ACRS is a residual class, covering property which does not come under the three year class
period, or the longer periods for depreciable real property and for long-lived periods for deprecia-
ble real property and for long-lived public utility property. The latter presents an important ex-
ception to the general rapid write-off treatment of personal property under ACRS. "Public utili-
ty property" is that property described in 5 167(1)(3)(A). Id. S 168(g)(1). Such property with an
ADR midpoint life of between eighteen and twenty-five years may not be depreciated over ten
years, id. 5 l68(c)(2)(i), while a fifteen-year write-off is permitted for public utility assets with an
ADR midpoint life greater than twenty-five years. Id. S 168(c)(2)(E).
" Id. S 168(c)(2)(D). The fifteen year write-off period applies to section 1250 with an
ADR midpoint life of greater than 12.5 years. Id. Section 1250 property with a midpoint life of
12.5 years or less is assigned to the ten year write-off period. Id. S 168(c)(2)(C)(ii). This system of
few depreciation classes and fast write-off is essentially the Capital Cost Recovery Act, or the
"ten-five-three" scheme originally proposed by Congressmen Conable and Jones in 1979, ex-
cept that the recovery period for real property has been lengthened from ten to fifteen years.
42 See id. S 168(b)(1)(A); (B); (C).
" See Treas. Reg. S 1.167(a)-11(c)(2)(iii) (1982).
44 See S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 105, 155.
45 See id. at 51, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 156.
- 46 This has been amended. See supra note 3. It should be noted that the switchover to
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For real property in the fifteen-year recovery class, except low income
rental housing, exact pei-centage allowances are not specified in the Act. In-
stead, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to assign percentages
which would approximate the benefits of using 175% declining balance with a
switchover to straight-line timed to maximize the investor's tax benefits." For
low income housing the Secretary is directed to assign percentages approx-
imating a 200% declining balance method with a switchover to straight-line,
again timed to maximize the deductions allowed to an investor." Unlike the
rules for personal property," no half-year convention is applied in calculating
real property deductions.
As an alternative to these ACRS depreciation schedules, investors may elect
the straight-line over depreciated method. If elected, straight-line depreciation
may be made over either the normal recovery period or one of two "extended"
recovery periods specified for each recovery class. 50
Table 2
Extended Recovery Periods"
Class (Years)	 Extended Recovery Periods (Years)
	
3	 5, 12
	
5	 12, 25
	
.10
	 25, 35
	
15	 35, 45
Generally, for purposes of calculating corporate earnings and profits, the
corporate taxpayer must use the straight-line method over a period equal to the
shorter of the two extended recovery periods. 52 If, however, the corporate tax-
payer elects the longer extended recovery period for cost recovery purposes, it
must also use that period for calculating earnings and profits." This provision
represents an attempt to prevent the "losses" at the corporate level generated
by ACRS from spilling over into the shareholders' tax treatment of corporate
distributions, turning taxable dividends into nontaxable returns of capital.
Under previous law, the same lifetime applied to the calculation of earnings
and profits and the calculation of tax depreciation (although straight-line was
straight-line or sum-of-the-years digits in the second year does not necessarily maximize the
value of switching over to the investor. For example, for 1981-1984, a switchover to straight-line
in the third year would give a larger second year allowance to assets in the five-year class.
" I.R.C. S 168(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
48 Id. S 168(b)(2)(A)(ii).
49 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
" See I.R.C. S 168(f)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1982). The election is made on a class-by-
class basis. See id. S 168(f)(2)(C)(ii)(I). For 15-year real property, however, the election may be
made on a property-by-property basis. See id. 5 168(f)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
5 ' See id. S 168(b)(2)(C)(i).
52 See id. 5 312(k)(3)(A).
" Id. S 312(k)(3)(C).
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always assumed for the former)." The use of different lifetimes for the two
calculations is consonant with the view that the recovery periods are no longer
intended to bear any close relationship to the concept of an asset's "useful
life.
Property purchased by the taxpayer before 1981 does not qualify for
ACRS, 55 but used property the taxpayer purchases after January 1, 1981, does
so qualify. 56 That is, ACRS applies to all property purchased by the current
owner after the effective date, regardless of when the asset was originally
manufactured, sold and placed in service. 57 This application of ACRS to used
property is limited to bona fide transactions by a series of "anti-churning" rules
which hinder the taxpayer in obtaining ACRS benefits on property the tax-
payer placed in service prior to January 1, 1981. 58 For transfers between
related parties or sale-leaseback arrangements, the purchaser must continue
the depreciation practice of the as'set's prior owner."
As a result of the shortening of recovery periods for asset depreciation
through ACRS, a number of other issues had to be addressed in ERTA. One
was the method of calculating earnings and profits, discussed above. 60 Second,
assets in the three-year recovery class receive a 6% investment tax credit 6 '
rather than the 3 Y3 % credit which an asset with that lifetime received prior to
ERTA. 62 Similarly, all other personal property in the five, ten and fifteen year
classes receives the full 10% credit. 63
A second issue requiring treatment by ERTA due to ACRS was the recap-
ture of accelerated depreciation upon the sale of an asset. The treatment of per-
sonal property remains undisturbed by ERTA: all sale proceeds representing
prior depreciation are taxed at ordinary rather than capital gains rates." For
example, the sale of an asset purchased for $100 with a current basis of $20 will
result in the ordinary taxation of the difference between the sale price and $20
for any sale price up to $100 and capital gains taxation of any amount by which
sale price exceeds $100. Under ERTA, however, real property is accorded ex-
actly the same recapture treatment as personal property if straight-line
depreciation is not used. 65
 If straight-line is used, then the previous method of
recapture for real property applies: only the difference between straight-line
" I.R.C. S 312(k)(1) (1976).
" I.R.C. S 168(e)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
56 See id,
67
 See id.
58 See id. S 168(e)(4) (West Supp. 1982).
59 See id. S 168(e)(4)(H)(ii).
60 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
61 See I.R.C. 5 46(c)(7)(B) (West Supp. 1982). The statute grants the taxpayer a credit
on three-year property equal to 60% of the qualified investment amount. Id. See supra note 31.
62 I.R.C. S 46(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 31.
65 See I.R.C. S 46(c)(7)(A), Recovery property in these classes is entitled to a credit on a
full 100% of the qualified investment amount. See supra note 31. TEFRA has introduced a 50%
basis adjustment for ten FTC. See supra note 3.
64 See I.R.C. 5 1245(a) (West Supp. 1982).
65 Id.
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basis and actual basis (zero in the above hypothetical case) .
 is subject to or-
dinary income taxation. 66
 Thus, a disincentive has been introduced against the
use of the full ACRS depreciation benefits for those purchasers of real estate
who intend to sell after a reasonably short period.
Investment credit recapture under ERTA is similar to previous law and is
unaffected by ACRS. The credit must be "given back" pro rata (though
without interest) if the period the asset was held before resale was less than the
minimum specified for full credit. 67
 Thus, an asset in the five year class sold
after three years would have to pay back 40% of the credit originally
received." ERTA also increases the amount of newly purchased used property
to which an investor can apply the investment tax credit from the curent limit
of $100 thousand" to $125 thousand in 1981 and $150 thousand in 1985." To
the extent of this limitation, it is now possible to obtain the full ITC every five
years on a qualifying asset through resale.
The final issue raised by the enactment of ACRS is how to maximize the
availability of the large acceleration of depreciation allowances. ERTA at-
tempts to allow all businesses, including those with current losses, to benefit
from these new investment incentives. Due to the increased depreciation under
ACRS, many taxpayers will be thrown into the position of having a net
operating loss, for tax purposes. Consequently, since the income tax is not
refundable, the absence of taxable income imposes a ceiling on the extent to
which the tax benefits of the new legislation could be obtained. One method for
raising this ceiling is to increase carryover periods for depreciation deductions.
ERTA contains such a provision, extending the carryover period for net
operating losses and the investment tax credit to fifteen years from the
previously permitted seven year carry forward!' This extension of the car-
ryover period only partially extends the range of firms capable of benefitting
from ACRS. Firms with a record of losses or new firms without any record of
profit or loss must still carry net operating losses forward. This involves a loss
in interest on the delayed depreciation deductions as well as a cash flow con-
straint.
To remedy this problem and increase further the coverage of ACRS, the
Economic Recovery Tax Act created a "safe harbor" for a broad range of sale-
leaseback arrangements, the effect of which is to allow transactions which are
very similar to the outright sale of depreciation deductions and investment tax
credits!' Under a sale-leaseback deal, a business purchases a depreciable asset
66 Id.
67 See id. $ 47(a)(5). For three-year property, the entire credit will be recaptured if the
property is disposed of within the first year, two-thirds if within the second year, etc., until year
four, when there is no recapture. Id. § 47(a)(5)(13). For all other classes of property, the entire
credit will be recaptured if the property is disposed of within the first year, 80% if within the sec-
ond year, etc., until year six, when there is no recapture. Id.
68 See id.
69 See I.R.C. § 48(c)(2)(A) (1976).
70 See I.R.C. 48(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
" See id. $ 172(b)(1)(13).
72 See id. S 168(0(8).
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that it intends to use and resells it to another, which can then take the cost
recovery allowances and investment credit. Subsequently, that company (the
lessor) then leases it back to the original purchaser (the lessee). Generally
speaking, under ERTA, as long as the lessor is a corporation and had an "at
risk" investment of at least 10% of the asset's adjusted basis throughout the
lease, the transaction would be characterized as a lease." Among the ar-
rangements allowed within this "safe harbor" were financing of the other 90%
of the purchase price by a loan from the lessee; retention by the lessee of
nominal ownership of the property for other legal purposes, such as title posses-
sion and payment of local property taxes; 74
 and resale arrangements whereby
the lessor is obligated to sell the asset back to the lessee at the termination of the
lease below its fair market value. 75
 With these provisions, it was possible to
structure a lease so that lessor and lessee need exchange money only at the
commencement of the lease. 76
While such an arrangement would appear to make the lease indistinguish-
able from the simple sale of depreciation allowances and investment credits, it
differs in certain important respects. For example, although the Treasury has
recently promulgated regulations on the issue," it is not yet entirely clear that
lessors can escape fully all risks associated with the potential bankruptcy of
lessees." In addition, in the case of mass transportation equipment owned by
" See id. SS 168(f)(8)(A), (B), (C). Eligible lessor corporations do not include sub-
chapter corporations, id. § 168(0(8)(8)(0(I), or personal holding companies, id., but they may
include partnership or grantor trusts where each partner or grantor is an eligible lessor corpora-
tion in its own right. Id, 5 168(1)(8)(B)(i)(II), (III). The 10% at risk" minimum investment
must be maintained by the lessor throughout the lifetime of the lease. Id. S 168(f)(8)(B)(ii). Addi-
tionally, the term of the lease, including any extensions, cannot exceed 90% of the property's
useful life (determined under 5 167), or 150% of the asset's ADR midpoint lifetime period, deter-
mined under the ADR system. Id. § 168(0(8)(B)(iii).
The safe-harbor leasing provisions of 5 168 apply only to "qualified leased property."
Id. § 168(0(9)(A). Generally speaking, "qualified leased property" is defined in 5 168 as
recovery property which is new section 38 property leased within three months of the date when
the property was first placed in service. See id. § 168(0(8)(D). If the parties enter into such a sale
and lease back agreement, and if they treat the agreement as a lease and make an election to have
5 168(f)(8) apply to the agreement, and if the above-described requirements of 5 168(0(8)(B) are
satisfied, then the agreement will be treated as a lease, and the lessor shall be treated as the owner
of the property. Id. 5 168(f)(8)(A). As such, the lessor will be entitled to the available ACRS
deductions and investment credit. No other factors will be relevant on the classification of the
agreement as a lease. Id. S 168(f)(8)(C). Hence, prior law governing sale and lease back agree-
ments (see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39 and Rev. Prov. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715) will
have no effect on agreements which meet the requirements of the safe-harbor leasing rules of
168(1)(8)(C).
74 See Temp. Reg. 5 5c.168(0(8)-1(c)2, 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 11780H.
" See I.R.C. 5 168(f)(8)(C); see also supra note 73.
76 See infra discussion presented in text and notes at section V.
" See Temp. Reg. S 5c.168(0(8), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) I
1780A-1780H.
78
 If the lessee "sells or assigns his interest in" the lease property prior to the termina-
tion of the sale and leaseback agreement, the agreement will cease to be characterized as a lease
under the terms of 5 168(0(8) as of the date of the transfer, unless the transferee agrees to take as
a lease, prior law (see supra note 75) governing the treatment of sale and leaseback agreements
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state and local governments and financed by tax-exempt bonds, the current
leasing arrangements allow the lessee to be a rim-taxable entity." This ar-
rangement makes it possible for such a government to "sell" credits and
depreciation allowances for which it would never be eligible itself.
The increased deductions provided by the enactment of ACRS were ex-
pected to produce a substantial revenue loss for the Treasury. As always, the
revenue cost of such a large tax reduction as ACRS would be difficult to
measure with any precision; such a calculation requires estimates of how much
investment and other sources of revenue would occur with ACRS as well as
how much would have occurred without ACRS. While macroeconomic models
exist and can be applied for such purposes, one can have confidence only in the
rough magnitudes rather than the exact values of predictions. This lack of
precision is not a fault of the model-builders; there is simply too much uncer-
tainty about the future to make precise forecasts. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to examine the revenue costs that have been projected for ACRS.
must be satisfied. Temp. Reg. 5 5c.168(0(8)-8(a), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) I
1780H. If the lessee would be deemed to be the owner of the property without regard to
168(0(8), disqualification will be treated as a sale of the property by the lessor to the lessee.
Temp. Reg. 5 5c.168(1)(8)-8(d), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 1780H. The amount
realized on the sale will include all consideration received and/or remaining due to the lessor
under the agreement. Id. The sale would also trigger recapture of the AC RS deductions and the
investment credit. Temp. Reg. S 5c.168(i)(8)-8(e), example (1), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 1780H. The temporary regulations provide tax if the lessee's interest in the lease or in
the property is sold or assigned in a federal or state bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, the
argeement will retain its character as a lease and the assignee or purchaser will take the property
subject to the lease if:
(1) Prior to the sale the lessor gives written notice of his federal income tax ownership to
the relevant court and to either the trustee, receiver or similar person or debtor, if the debtor re-
mains in possession of the property. Temp. Reg. S 5c.168(f)(8)-2(a)(6)(8), 1982 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) i 1780H. This notice must request that a copy of the notice be forwarded to
the assignee or purchaser prior to the sale. Id. Within 60 days after the sale assignment or sale the
lessor must itself notify the assignee or purchaser of its interest and provide the assignee or pur-
chaser with a copy of the lease, Id. If the transaction is a sale and leaseback transaction, the lessor
must also provide notice of its purchase money obligation. Id.
(2) The lessor must also file notice of the transaction with its next tax return. Id. 5
5c.168(0(8)-2(a)(6)(ii), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 1780H.
(3) Prior to the sale any party with a perfected security interest in the property which
arose not later than the time the lessee first used the property must "specifically either exclude or
release in writing the Federal income tax ownership of the property from their interests." Id. 5
5c.168(0(8)-2(8)(6)(iii), 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ¶ 1780H. The assignee or pur-
chaser must also file notice of the transaction with its next tax return. Id. S 5c.168(1)(8)-2(a)(6),
1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 1708B. Subsequent transfers of the property (outside of
the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding) during the term of the lease will not disturb the charac-
terization of the lease as such if either (1) prior to the transfer the lessor gives the transferee notice
of its interest and a copy of the lease and files notice of the transaction with its next tax return, or
(2) the transferee agrees in writing within 60 days of the transfer to take the property subject to
the lease and the notice required in 5 5c.168(0(8)-2(a)(5) is filed by the lessor and transferee. Id.
Failure to abide by the notice requirements and the requirement concerning the consents of par-
ties with security interests in the lease property will cause the safe harbor protection of 5 168(0(8)
for the lease agreement to expire. Temp. Reg. S 5c.168(0(8)-7(d)(10), (11), (12), 1982 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. (CCH) i 1780H.
79 See I . R.C. S 168(f)(8)(D)(iii) (West Supp. 1982).
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Table 3 presents estimates by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the
Office of Tax Analysis of the Treasury of the annual revenue loss following
from the adoption of ACRS during the fiscal years 1981-1986.
Table 3
Revenue Cost of ACRS
(Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal Year OTA8° JCT"
1981 2.02 1.56
1982 8.98 10.66
1983 17.15 18.60
1984 28.05 28.28
1985 41.32 39.27
1986 61.35 54.47
The estimates, which are quite similar, predict an annual loss which grows
steadily throughout the period and, presumably, would continue to grow if
calculations for later years were available. There are three reasons for this
growth over time. First, as the nominal amount of investment grows —
through real growth as well as inflation — so grow the depreciation deductions
and investment credits investors receive. Moreover, only that fraction of
capital purchased after 1981 would be receiving the new cost recovery
allowances. 82
 As the years pass, this fraction will include a larger fraction of the
total capital stock. Finally, the phase-in provision, for personal property, of the
degree of acceleration of deductions over the specified recovery period, 83 must
also contribute to a growth in revenue loss."
80 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 10, at B-1.
t See U.S. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 9, at 315.
82 The ACRS deductions are not available for property which was used by the taxpayer
before December 31, 1980. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
es See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
a* While these numbers are large by historical standards, they appear small when com-
pared to the revenue losses projected by OTA and JCT to result from the personal tax cut
enacted in ERTA. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 9, at 57, projects a
loss of $196 billion in 1986 alone from personal tax cuts, while the Treasury's Office of Tax
Analysis, supra note 10, at B-1, estimates the loss to be $174 billion. These numbers, however,
are not really comparable to the estimates for ACRS since, even with a constant rate of inflation,
"bracket creep" caused by the progressivity of the individual rate schedule would have caused
tax receipts to rise. No similar increase is built into the corporate tax since the tax rate on virtual-
ly all income is the same with all corporate income over $100 thousand being taxed at a 46% rate.
I.R.C. 11(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982). A January 1981 study by the Congressional Budget Office
suggested that indexing the tax system as of January 1, 1981 would have resulted in a revenue
loss of $182.1 billion by FY 1985. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF PRESI-
DENT CARTER'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
ANALYSIS BY THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE). Shifting this number back to 1986 to
allow for the later passage of ERTA suggests that, in the aggregate, the personal tax cut exceeds
indexing by very little.
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The enactment of ACRS and its correlative provisions was intended to
stimulate business investment by enlarging its associated tax benefits, while it
also was expected to produce a substantial tax revenue loss. Yet, ACRS was
not the only modification of the depreciation system considered by Congress.
Prior to the passage of ERTA, several alternative proposals for revamping the
depreciation system surfaced. An examination of these alternatives suggests
that the depreciation system created by ERTA was generally both more
generous and more distortionary than these other proposals.
III. OTHER PROPOSALS
While effective opposition to ACRS never surfaced in Congress, there
were a number of alternative depreciation programs proposed by members of
the House and Senate as well as the Carter Administration, beginning in 1980.
A. Alternatives Proposed to Congress
One proposal, passed by the Senate Finance Committee in the summer of
1980, 85
 would have established four, rather than two recovery classes for per-
sonal property, excluding public utility property, providing tax write-off
periods of two, four, seven and ten years rather than three and five." Under
this "2-4-7-10" proposal, assets in the two and four year classes were to receive
an investment tax credit of 2.5 and 6%, respectively," with the other classes
receiving the 10% full credit." Public utility property would have received a
liberalized ADR variance of 30% but otherwise have been unaffected." In-
vestors in real property were to be allowed a twenty-year lifetime, with
straight-line depreciation," and the option of using a fifteen-year straight-line
write-off period for low income rental housing" and a fifteen-year, 150%
declining balance write-off period for owner-occupied non-residential struc-
tures." The bill also would have cut the top corporate tax rate to 44%. 93
The pattern of depreciation allowances to be applied to assets in the four
personal property classes was somewhat novel. The taxpayer would have been
permitted to use a 200%, 150% or 100% declining balance rate." These per-
" See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON H.R.
5829, S. REP. NO. 940, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE].
" Id. at 49. For further details of this proposal, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF THE TAX CUT PROVISIONS OF H.R. 5829, August 25, 1980 [here-
inafter cited as Summary of the Joint Committee on Taxation].
67 SUMMARY OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 86, at 5.
" Id.
89 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, supra note 85, at 49, 54.
9° Id. at 65-66.
9 ' Id. at 66.
92 Id.
83 SUMMARY OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 86, at 6.
94 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, supra note 85.
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centages were to be applied to the aggregate sum of the bases of all assets
owned by the taxpayer in the relevant recovery class, rather than the current
practice of separately depreciating assets of different ages. 95 Moreover, the
percentage declining balance applied to each class could be changed annually
at the discretion of the investors. 96
 Finally, current recapture rules for personal
property would have been replaced by the requirement that the sale price of the
asset be deducted from the aggregate basis of the relevant recovery class ac-
count." Assets sold were thus to be treated in a way symmetrical to assets pur-
chased, in that depreciation allowances foregone by the seller would equal
those acquired by the purchaser.
Another alternative to ACRS, which was put forward by the Carter
Administration in 1980, was referred to as "constant-rate depreciation"
(CRD). 98 CRD was similar to 2-4-7-10 in that it called for a reduction in the
number of capital recovery classes (to 30) 99 and the application of a constant-
rate declining balance formula to open-ended recovery accounts.'°°
Two other proposed changes in depreciation methods would have re-
placed the stream of depreciation deductions taken on an asset for its tax
lifetime, or recovery period, with a single deduction in the year of purchase.
These two proposals were the First Year Capital Recovery System (FYCRS)
and the Democratic alternative to ACRS included in the Tax Incentive Act of
1981 (TIA), passed by the House Ways and Means Committee as an alter-
native to ERTA. Under the FYCRS,'°' each asset would have been assigned a
capital recovery deduction in the year of purchase equal to a certain fraction of
its full purchase price, with the exact value of this fraction varying across
classes of assets according to durability. The method of calculating such first-
year allowances was to estimate the fraction of its value an asset would lose
during each year of its productive life, and take the present value of such an-
nual measures of "economic depreciation" using a discount rate of 4%. Very
short-lived assets would have received nearly a dollar in allowances for each
dollar spent, while very long-lived assets would have been given less than half
of the purchase price as a deduction.'° 2 Like 2-4-7-10, FYCRS would have in-
troduced symmetric treatment to the disposal of assets, with sellers including in
95 See id. at 49-50.
96 Id. at 50.
" See id. at 50, 52-53.
98 See President's Economic Revitalization Program: Hearings before the Committee on the Budget,
House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 16 (1980).
99 See id.
1 °° See id. at 16, 109.
E 01 Auerbach and Jorgenson, The First-Year Capital Recovery System, HARVARD INSTITUT.
OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 740, HARVARD INSTITUT. OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH (February 1980), Reprinted in TAx NOTES, April 14, 1980; see also Auerbach and
Jorgenson, Inflation-Proof Depreciation of Assets, 58 Harv. Bus. Rev. (Sept.-Oct. 1980), at 113.
102 For example, an asset purchased for $100, and expected to lose one tenth of its value
every year, would receive a deduction of $71.43, based on the present value of the terms .1,
.1x(1-.1), .1(I-.1) 2 discounted at .04.
September 1982]	 ERTA — ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION	 1341
income the same amount that purchasers could deduct, the sale price
multiplied by the first-year allowance. Some versions of the first year system
also called for a repeal of the investment tax credit. The depreciation provision
included in the House Ways and Means Committee's TIA was a related, but
simpler and considerably more generous proposal. 1°3 This proposal would have
permitted a full, rather than fractional, write-off of personal property in the
first-year of acquisition,'" repealed the investment tax credit,'" and gradually
brought the corporate rate down to 34% . 1 " Real property would have received
treatment similar to that offered by ACRS.'"
B. Comparison of Alternative Proposals with ACRS
While all proposals, including ACRS, stressed simplicity in having few
recovery classes, 2-4-7-10 and CRD would have conveyed the added simplicity
of using aggregate open-ended recovery accounts, rather than the "vintage ac-
counts" by recovery class and year of purchase required under previous law
and retained under ACRS. This type of simplification could be possible only in
conjunction with the move to a constant-rate declining balance formula, as
provided in these proposals, since only under such a formula would the age
structure of the assets being depreciated have no effect on the total amount of
deductions. Only the current basis of each asset would be relevant. These bases
could be added together before the application of the percentage depreciation
rate. Since ACRS continues the traditional practice of using combinations of
depreciation methods, rather than a single declining balance formula for each
recovery class, it requires continuance of the more complicated vintage account
system. The TIA and FYCRS proposals were even simpler in this regard, since
assets to which they applied would have had a zero basis. A related simplifica-
tion included in all four alternative proposals but not in ACRS was the sym-
metry in tax treatment of purchasers and sellers of assets discussed above.
Neither 2-4-7-10 nor CRD would have provided tax reductions as large as
those estimated for ACRS. This difference in projected tax reductions can be
seen clearly from Table 4, which compares the projected revenue losses of the
forerunner of ACRS, 10-5-3, with those of 2-4-7-10 and CRD.'° 8
103 See COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 97TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF THE TAX INCENTIVE ACT OF 1981, H.R. 4242 (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS].
' 04 See ed. at 13-15.
1 05 See Id.
'°6 See Id.
1 ° 7 See Id. at 15. Real property generally would have been written off over a 15-year
period using a 150% declining balance method. Id. This is generally the same treatment that real
property receives under ACRS. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
108 The estimates for 10-5-3 rather than ACRS are presented here because the assump-
tions involved in estimating its revenue loss are comparable to those used for the alternative pro-
posals. The $74.5 billion loss in 1986 under 10-5-3 exceeds those estimates for ACRS supra cited
in text accompanying notes 9 and 10, because of changes such as the lengthening of the real prop-
erty recovery period, and may also be due to differences in the assumptions on which the
forecasts were based.
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Table 4
Revenue Cost Estimates of 10-5-3 and Two Alternatives 109
(Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal Year 10-5-3 2-4-7-10 CRD
1981 2.9 4.3 2.9
1982 10.8 13.7 9.0
1983 22.1 18.6 14.2
1984 37.8 19.0 18.4
1985 56.3 19.7 22.2
1986 74.5 21.0 25.4
Estimates of the revenue costs of the other two proposals based on com-
parable economic assumptions are not available. The House Ways and Means
Committee report accompanying TIA, however, estimated that the business
incentive provisions of TIA would rise from $1.5 billion in 1981 to $58.2 billion
in 1986, 10 figures comparable to the revenue losses anticipated for ACRS. 11 '
An earlier calculation of the revenue loss of FYCRS, if enacted at the begin-
ning of 1981, suggested a revenue loss reaching $28.7 billion by 1985. 1 ' 2
All of the proposals stressed simplicity, and most would have lowered to
some extent the tax burden on capital investment. The proposals differed,
however, in a number of respects important from an economic perspective,
such as the overall tax burden on investment, the distribution of this tax
burden across different assets, the sensitivity of this burden to inflation, the
revenue loss per dollar of investment and the distribution of incentives between
the investments of taxable and non-taxable investors.
IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Each of the characteristics of a business tax incentive discussed at the end
of the preceding section plays a role in determining how well a given proposal
will succeed in increasing productivity and welfare. To explore these
characteristics and their importance, it is necessary first to discuss the
economic criteria that are involved. There are three general areas of inquiry:
how distortionary is the tax incentive with respect to the investor's choice
among assets, how much new investment will it stimulate and how is the
stimulus distributed among different types of firms.
"" See ANALYSIS BY THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra. This table assumes a
January 1, 1981 effective date.
" 0 SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 103, at 23.
in See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 10.
ii2 See Auerbach and Jorgenson, supra note 101, at 117 .
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First, it long has been recognized that virtually all taxes distort economic
behavior. "s This reduction in economic efficiency resulting from taxation is
referred to as the "deadweight loss" or "excess burden" of the tax system.
While it may be inevitable that some efficiency will be sacrified in order to raise
revenue, not all taxes impose the same excess burden per dollar of revenue
raised. Some tax structures are more efficient than others. The area of study
called "optimal tax theory" seeks to characterize tax system that are relatively
efficient in the sense of raising a given amount of revenue with the least distor-
tion in economic activity.''* While the results of such work are fairly com-
plicated, certain basic rules do come out. First, it is usually more efficient to tax
activities that are relatively unresponsive to price changes."' For example,
how high the overall tax burden on savings and investment ought to be, from
an efficiency perspective, would depend on how responsive savings is to
changes in the after-tax rate of return." 6 Second, it is relatively inefficient to
raise revenue through a distortion of production activity."' Such a distortion
would arise in the allocation of capital, for example, if different types of invest-
ment income were taxed at different rates. This differential taxation would
cause a shift of investment into the more lightly taxed types of assets. The term
"neutrality" is often used to describe a tax system that does not distort produc-
tion efficiency."B Of course, full neutrality with respect to the allocation of
capital would call for comparable treatment of nonbusiness capital and
business capital. Nonbusiness capital, which consists mostly of owner-occupied
housing, currently receives very favorable treatment under the tax law. To the
extent that taxes on capital are higher in the business than in the nonbusiness
sector, any proposal which lowers business taxes, thus effecting a shift of
capital from residential to non-residential uses, increases allocative efficiency.
An issue related to this concern for tax efficiency is how the tax treatment
of assets is influenced by changes in the inflation rate. Under any capital
recovery system where depreciation allowances are based on original cost, the
"3 The only exceptions are "lump sum" taxes, such as head taxes, because they are
levied on individuals without regard to any aspect of economic activity. Since the individual can
do nothing to lessen the tax, he will not be induced to distort his behavior. Unfortunately, this
"strength" is also what makes lump-sum taxes impractical.
L" See, e.g., Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. OF PUB.
ECON., 37, 37-38 (1976).
1 " Id. at 45-47.
" 6 The issues of how responsive savings is and how heavily it should be taxed is at pres-
ent a hotly debated one in the area of Public Finance. See generally, J. PECHMAN, WHAT SHOULD
BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE (1980) [hereinafter cited as PECHMANI. Many have
argued in favor of a cash-flow or "consumption" tax that would allow individuals a deduction
from the income tax base for net saving. Id. at vii. Such a tax change would also involve either
elimination of the corporate tax or an alternative adjustment that would effectively eliminate the
tax for income from new investments. See id. at 239-49. There are, however, other arguments in
favor of a consumption tax aside from those relating to efficiency. See id. at 102-09.
" 7 See Diamond and Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I, 61 AM. ECON.
REV. 8, 8-27 (1971).
"e See Auerbach, Tax Neutrality and the Social Discount Rate, 17 J. OF PUB. ECON., 355,
355-72 (1982).
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effect of inflation is to lower the real value of future depreciation allowances.
The allowances' nominal values remain unaffected, but they are worth less in
terms of real purchasing power. Inflation thus may reduce economic efficiency
for two reasons. First, it raises the overall tax burden on investment income to
what might be an inefficiently high level. Second, its differential impact across
different investments leads to production distortions. 19
The second general line of inquiry into the efficiency of a given proposal is
how much new investment will be generated by reductions in tax revenue.
How much "bang per buck" (i.e., new investment attributable to incentive
created) a tax reduction has depends on at least three factors. The first ques-
tion, is how effective a tax reduction is at focusing on the behavior it seeks to
encourage. In the context of analyzing the changes contained in ERTA, this
ability to focus effectively depends on the treatment of old versus new assets.
Plans that reduce the tax burden on income from existing assets are more costly
because only part of the tax reduction goes toward encouraging new invest-
ment. 12 ° The second issue is how a tax investment incentive plan is phased in
over time. Encouraging or discouraging investment today is possible through
changes in the tax structure scheduled to occur in the near future. An example
of this change in the tax structure over time is the phasing in under ACRS of
the full depreciation deductions for personal property investments between
1981 and 1986. 12 ' The final, and most general, question in determining how
much investment will be generated by tax reductions concerns the responsive-
ness of investors to tax incentives. Such responsiveness depends on a number
of factors, including the responsiveness of businesses to changes in the tax
treatment of investment income as well as the responsiveness of savers to the
net rate of return. The latter element is relevant because if a tax cut does
stimulate investment, businesses will seek more funds in the capital market. As
they do so, the price of funds — the interest rate — will be bid up. How high it
will go depends on how responsive savers are to its increase. Empirical
evidence on this savings responsiveness is weak: 22 Evidence on the responsive-
ness of business investment to tax incentives suggests that previous changes in
depreciation schedules and the investment tax credit have led to increased in-
vestment, although different views exist about the magnitudes involved.'"
119 See Auerbach, Inflation and the Choice of Asset Life, 87 J. OF POL. ECON. 621, 621-22
(1979).
129 Indeed, it would be cheaper still to offer incentives only to that new investment that
would not otherwise have occurred, but this alternative would be impossible to implement. A
more sensible approach that has come up over the years is to apply the incentives only to the in-
crement in investment over the average of investment in previous years. This approach is
precisely the way in which the new tax credit for research and development has been structured.
121 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
122 For conflicting views of the responsiveness of savings to the rate of return, compare
Boskin, Taxation, Saving and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. OF POL. ECON. S3 (1978) with PECHMAN,
supra note 116, at 17-31.
129 For a recent analysis, see R.S. CHIRINKO AND R. EISNER, THE EFFECTS OF TAX
PARAMETERS ON THE INVESTMENT EQUATIONS IN MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS, OFFICE
OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER No 47, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (January 1981).
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A final area of inquiry relevant to determining how well a business tax in-
centive program will succeed in increasing productivity and welfare is how the
plan treats similar assets purchased by different investors, particularly those
with and without taxable income. Generally, benefits in the form of increased
deductions and credits will be limited to businesses that can offset those bene-
fits against taxable income. This limitation restricts the ability of firms without
taxable income from taking advantage of the tax cut. Whether so limiting the
advantage of a business tax incentive is economically desirable is open to ques-
tion. On the one hand is the argument that full availability (via refundability,
for example) encourages poorly managed companies to continue operation. On
the other hand, profits as measured for tax purposes only vaguely resemble real
economic earnings because depreciation allowances do not reflect economic
depreciation. Further, the "bad management" argument cannot fairly be ap-
plied to new firms without any earnings history. Indeed, the indirectness and
complication of the new "safe harbor" leasing included in ACRS seems to
have been aimed in part at satisfying proponents on each side of this debate.
The foregoing discussion suggests that an effective investment incentive
will provide a neutral stimulus, across different assets, that is insensitive to the
inflation rate, and will focus this stimulus on new investment. Against this
standard for a business tax investment incentive program, the program
adopted by ERTA can be assessed.
V. THE ECONOMICS OF ACRS
Having set out the criteria relevant to our inquiry, we consider now the
structure of ACRS. With respect to its investment stimulation component,
ACRS limits the ability of investors to get any additional tax benefits for assets
first put in service before January 1, 1981. 124 In this sense, it should produce a
large "bang per buck" relative to other proposals that included a reduction in
corporate taxes, since the latter would have reduced taxes even for those mak-
ing no new investments. As indicated above, the anti-churning rules prevent a
taxpayer from obtaining ACRS benefits on property the taxpayer put in service
prior to 1981. 125 And while obtaining ACRS on used property through a
transfer of ownership is possible,' 25 the overall tax benefits of such transfers
might be negative. A negative tax benefit might result from applying ACRS to
used property because the prospective increase in depreciation allowances
would be accompanied by an immediate recapture of earlier deductions.'"
While some cases in which a sale would generate net tax benefits are possible,
such possibilities do not appear to be a significant problem.
'" See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
122 The sale of the property would trigger the recapture of the depreciation deductions,
I.R.C. S 47(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982). The overall tax benefits of the transaction would be nega-
tive if the amount of the recapture exceeds the present value of the stream of ACRS deductions,
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The other part of the "bang per buck" question concerns the phase-in of
ACRS for personal property. Because investments made in 1986, and 1985 to a
lesser extent, would have received more favorable treatment than assets pur-
chased in 1981 through 1984, 128
 some investors possessing a degree of flexibil-
ity in the timing of their purchases might have waited until 1986 to invest in
order to obtain the greater benefits not available to them. Such delays in pur-
chasing would have lessened the expansionary effect of ACRS on the economy
in the next four years. Whether this is good or bad from a macroeconomic
perspective largely depends on the severity of the current recession and how ex-
pansionary the rest of the federal government's tax-expenditure program
ultimately turns out to be.
Regarding the investment distortion criterion, a measurement of the
distortions associated with ACRS requires the measurement of the burden im-
posed on different investments. Table 5 displays values, discounted at an after-
tax rate of 12%, of depreciation allowances received by typical investments in
the three, five and fifteen year classes.
Table 5
Present Value of Depreciation Allowances under ACRS
(per dollar invested)
Discount Rate = 12%
Year of Purchase
Asset Class 1981-1984 1985 1986
3 year 129
Present Value (PV)
of Deductions .8842 .9010 .9072
Investment Tax Credit .1304 .1304 .1304
(ITC)/.46
Total (A) 1.0147 1.0314 1.0376
which the transferee would be entitled to take as a result of his ownership of the property. For ex-
ample, suppose a piece of equipment in the 5-year class was purchased for $100, received the tax
credit and now has a basis of zero and a potential sale price of 340. If a sale occurred, the seller
would pay taxes immediately on $40 of income, while the purchaser could take deductions equal
to $40 over five years. If they were in the same tax bracket, the taxes paid immediately by the
seller would exceed, in present value, the taxes avoided over the succeeding five years because
the present value of the ACRS deduction the buyer would receive over the next five years would
be less than the amount of tax which the seller would be required to pay immediately. Only to the
limited extent that the investment tax credit could be taken again might this transaction be
worthwhile. For structures, the tax on recapture would be lower because of the capital gains
treatment of the gain over straight-line basis. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
19
 Based on schedules reported in Table 1 supra at text accompanying note 42.
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PV of Deductions .7968 .8387 .8418
ITC/.46 .2174 .2174 .2174
Total (A) 1.0142 1.0561 1.0592
15 year"'
PV of Deductions .5515 .5515 .5515
ITC/.46 0 0 0
Total (A) .5515 .5515 .5515
For the three and five year classes, the deduction equivalent in after-tax dollars
to the investment credit (for a corporation in the top bracket) also is calculated
to obtain the combined effect of investment related credits and deductions,
labeled "A." These values rise over time for the personal property classes
because of the phase-in of the schedule of depreciation allowances but exceed
one even in 1981. There, the combination of depreciation deductions and the
investment credit offers a greater tax shield than immediate expensing without
the ITC, the alternative proposed by House Democrats in 1981. 132 This out-
come does not hold for most structures, which receive the present-value
equivalent of about fifty-five cents in deductions per dollar invested.
A useful way of understanding these numbers is to ask what reduction in
tax rate on the income from these investments the investor would require in ex-
change for giving up the credits and deductions of ACRS and replacing them
with deductions which are consistent with economic depreciation. That is,
what effective tax rate on true economic income is imposed by the combination
of a statutory tax rate of 46% and investment tax credit and a rapid write-off.
To derive this effective tax rate, we must know what the economic depreciation
of assets actually is, and must make assumptions about the inflation rate and
the real after-tax rate of return earned by corporations on their investments.
Table 6 represents effective tax rate calculations for five representative types of
investment in the three main recovery classes. For a real discount rate, we use
4%.' 33 Estimates of declining-balance rates of economic depreciation are ob-
tained from a recent U.S. Treasury study.' 34 Effective tax rates for each asset
are computed for hypothetical inflation rates of 6% and 8%.
' 3u Id.
191 Based on 175% declining balance with a switchover to straight-line in year eight and
purchase six months into the tax year. (Set supra note 47 and accompanying text.)
'" See supra notes 103-07, 110, 112 and accompanying text.
153 The use of this rate follows Auerbach and Jorgenson, Inflation-Proof Depreciation of
Assets, supra note 101, at 114. It was chosen as a value representative of recent corporate experi-
ence.
154 C. FIULTEN AND F. WYKOFF, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX AND ECONOMIC
DEPRECIATION OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
1979.
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Table 6
Effective Tax Rates under ACRS'"
Asset
Class
Recovery
Period
(years)
Economic
Depreciation
Rate135
ETR for
inflation
Rate =
6%	 8%
Trucks, buses
and trailers 3 .254
1981-1984
—24.7% —10.1%
1985
—40.5 —24.5
1986
—47.3 —30.8
Construction
machinery 5 .172
1981-1984
— 17.0 —	 5.2
1985
—37.4 — 24.0
1986 — 39.1
— 25.0
General Industrial
Equipment 5 .122
1981-1984
— 23.5 — 6.9
1985
— 55.3 — 33.9
1986
— 58.2 — 36.5
Industrial Buildings 15 .036 39.4 42.1
Commercial Buildings 15 .025 35.8 38.3
The most startling result in Table 6 perhaps is that a majority of the
calculated effective tax rates are negative: investors who purchase assets in the
three-year and five-year recovery classes would prefer ACRS to the abolition of
corporation taxation.'" This outcome is perfectly possible, and consistent with
the results in Table 5, where such assets were found to have equivalent deduc-
tions and credits in excess of immediate write-off. In fact, these conditions are
the same. As others have pointed out in the past, immediate write-off converts
the corporate tax to a "partnership" where government bears an equal
percentage of costs and receipts, with each "partner" earning the before-tax
rate of return on investment. Hence, a system such as ACRS, in which the
benefits given to some classes of assets are more generous than immediate
"5 Derived according to formula t T/]1 + ( 11=g) (A — 4 )] where "C (the corporate tax
rate) .46, r (the expected after-tax real rate of return) .04, A is as defined in Table 5 and S is
the economic depreciation rate. Further details provided by the author upon request.
'” Estimated rate of declining-balance economic depreciation.
137
 Similar results may be found in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS, at 122-25 (1982).
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write-off, is equivalent to government bearing a greater fraction of the initial
cost than it receives of the future flows: it is subsidizing the project. Moreover,
these calculations assume no debt is used to finance the project. Since interest
payments are tax deductible, 138 these additional tax savings provided by the in-
terest deduction would make the effective tax rates more negative for projects
financed in part by borrowing.
These negative tax rates differ across types of personal property, but the
key difference is between personal property and real property. At an inflation
rate of 6%, the effective tax rates on industrial buildings and general industrial
equipment would differ by almost 98 percentage points after 1985. This poses
an enormous distortion in the allocation of industrial capital.
Besides differing by asset class, the effective tax rates also depend on the
inflation rate that prevails, because depreciation allowances received in future
years are eroded to the extent that prices rise between the date of purchase and
the date of the allowances. 139 These rates rise more for the personal property
classes, though they are still negative at an inflation rate of . In fact, it
would take a long-run inflation rate of approximately 14% to bring the
post-1985 effective tax rate out of the negative range.
These effective tax rates, especially those for equipment, are substantially
lower than those that would have applied had any of the alternatives to ACRS
discussed above been enacted. For example, under "2-4-7-10," the effective
tax rates at 8% inflation would have been + 0.50% for trucks, buses and
trailers, + 0.65% for construction machinery and + 0.85% for general in-
dustrial equipmentm — virtually the same as in the House expensing proposal
included in the Tax Incentive Act of 1981. 141 The Carter Administration pro-
posal specifically precluded the total tax benefits for any asset from exceeding
those of expensing.'" Thus, that proposal would have produced effective tax
rates on personal property similar to those of 2-4-7-10 and the House proposal.
Under the version of First-Year System which included no investment tax
credit, the effective tax rate would have been 46% for all assets."'
Moreover, the effective tax rates under ACRS will be more sensitive to in-
flation than would have been true under either the TIA or First Year pro-
posals. Since each of the latter two plans offered a deduction only in the year of
158 I.R.C. $ 163(a) (1976).
199 An additional and offsetting effect of inflation would be present if debt finance were
used, for the deductibility of nominal rather than real interest payments lower the real after-tax
interest rate corresponding to a given real before-tax rate. For further discussions, see Auerbach,
Inflation and the Tax Treatment of Firm Behavior, 71 Am. ECON. REV. 419, 419-23 (1981).
14o Calculations assume the first asset class would have received a 2.5% tax credit and
200% (double) declining balance over two years, while the other two would have received a 6%
credit and use 200% declining balance over four years.
' 41 See SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 103.
142 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
"3 See Auerbach and Jorgenson, Inflation-Proof Depreciation of Assets, supra note 101, at
115.
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purchase,'" the value of such deductions would not have been influenced by
fluctuations in the rate of inflation.
ACRS, therefore, constitutes a substantial stimulus to investment, but
one which is very distortionary in its distribution across different assets and
sensitive to the rate of inflation. Alternative proposals would have been less
generous but also less distortionary. The incentives offered by two of the alter-
natives — the TIA and FYCRS proposals — would have been less sensitive to
the inflation rate, because their structures provide the entire incentive in the
year of purchase.
Aside from the distortion caused by such large differences in tax rates
among investments competing for the same funds, it is not necessarily efficient
to tax corporate capital income at a rate near or below zero, in the aggregate. 145
Given that such rates were being set, however, a serious problem of coverage
would have arisen had not something like the safe-harbor for leasing been
created at the same time. Indeed, this problem would have become more acute
over the years, as greater fractions of the assets owned by companies fell under
ACRS. The tax losses generated by even profitable investments would, for a
number of companies, outweigh taxable income generated by real property,
pre-1981 depreciable assets and non-depreciable assets. Indeed, the revenue
cost estimates of ACRS cited in the introduction'" are so large a part of total
corporate tax collections that detailed calculations need not be made to
recognize the problem. ERTA's safe-harbor leasing rules make it possible to
structure a transaction so that a "lessor" makes a single, initial payment to a
"lessee," and obtains in return the investment tax credit and depreciation
deductions on the designated property. No more contact between the two par-
ties is necessary. The exact details of the agreement, however, will determine
how much the lessor is willing to pay for the credits and deductions. The
following analysis explains this point and gives a numerical example of one
such hypothetical transaction."'
Another issue that arises in the discussion of leasing is the question of
whether it should be available to all firms possessing tax losses. Imagine two
types of firms with current net operating losses and without the availability of a
carry back against previous taxable income. Type I, the "high growth" firm,
has "losses" primarily because the amount of investment it is undertaking cur-
rently produces large deductions which offset any current income. It will have
profits in future years once the current investments have been written off. The
Type II firm, perhaps one in financial distress, already has very large tax losses
144 See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text.
145 Naturally, important distributional issues are involved in such a large cut in capital
income taxes. Since, however, the main focus here is on ACRS as a reduction in capital income
taxes, such questions are not included within the scope of this article.
146 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
17 Under TEFRA, the rules with respect to safe-harbor leasing have been substantially
tightened, so that these calculations that follow will overstate the tax benefits that can now be
transferred through safe-harbor leasing.
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to carry forward. Even if its current investments generate a taxable profit, this
company will be able to offset such profit using its net operating loss carry for-
wards.'" Throughout the foreseeable future, it will be essentially non-taxable.
Without leasing, both types of firms would be required to carry forward those
tax benefits associated with the ITC and depreciation deductions. Even if they
generate taxable income in the future which the losses can offset, the com-
panies would receive a lower present discounted value from these tax shields.
In the case of Type I firms, this would put them at a competitive disadvantage
with firms having current taxable income: they would have to pay taxes on
their gross income when earned, but carry forward their deductions at the
beginning. Leasing would put them on a par with taxable firms. Given that for
the foreseeable future Type H firms expect to pay no tax on their earnings,
should they, too, be allowed deductions, as leasing would provide indirectly?
The apparent answer is no, that this would give them a tax advantage over the
other types of firms. The real answer to this problem, however, is more com-
plicated because of the presence of the ability to deduct interest.' 49
Under a typical leasing arrangement, the lessee purchases (or already has
purchased) the property in question. The lessor "purchases" it from the lessee
using up to 90% borrowed money,'" which it can be assumed is lent by the
lessee. Over the period of the lease, the lessor gets the opportunity to take the
applicable investment tax credit and depreciation deductions. The lessor
makes payments of principal and interest to the lessee on the outstanding loan,
while the lessee makes payments on the lease. These payments may be ar-
ranged to equal each other, so that no money need change hands when the
"payments" are made. At the end Of the term of the lease, the lessor pays off
the balance of the loan and the lessee "repurchases" the equipment at a price
specified in the lease. By arranging for principal and interest payments to equal
lease payments, and for the repurchase price to equal the terminal loan
balance, the parties to the lease need exchange money only upon the initial
purchase. Moreover, to avoid recapture of depreciation allowances, they can
arrange for the repurchase price to be nearly zero.
Under such an agreement, the lessor would have to pay taxes over the
course of the lease on the difference between lease payments made by the lessee
and interest payments made to the lessee. Similarly, the lessee, if taxable in
future years, would get the benefit of tax deductions of equal size. Thus, the in-
itial amount transferred from lessor to lessee constitutes only part of the "pay-
ment" the lessor makes to buy the lessee's depreciation deductions and tax
credit.
Table 7 presents the initial payment a potential lessor with discount rate p
would be willing to make during the period of 1981 - 1984 for a lease of length T,
i+8 See I.R.C. S 172 (West Supp. 1967, 1982).
1+9 For further discussion, see Warren and Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and
the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982). See infra notes 234-240 and ac-
companying text.
"° See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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with matching level annual payments (P), a zero repurchase price and a loan
interest rate of i.
Table 7
Lease Characteristics
(interest rate	 = 12%; asset price 1 dollar)
Value
of
Lease Deductions"' Initial' 52 Lease' 53
Recovery Discount Term plus Payment Payments
Class Rate(p) (T) Credit ( A) (x) (P)
3 years 12% 3 .467 .160 .349
10 3 .475 .154 .352
6.48 3 .489 .142 .357
12 5 .467 .212 .218
10 5 .475 .202 .221
6.48 5 .489 .180 .227
5 years 12 5 .467 .212 .218
10 5 .479 .209 .219
6.48 5 .504 .205 .220
12 10 .467 .303 .123
10 10 .479 .297 .124
6.48 10 .504 .279 :128
The main result of Table 7 is that although the initial payment, x, is far
less than the value of credits and deductions to the lessor, tA, it is not very sen-
sitive to the discount rate used. For example, a lessor with a discount rate of
151 Based on recovery schedules for 1981-1984 listed in Table 5 supra at text accompany-
ing notes 129-131.
152 Based on the following formula:
x TA - B(1 -TA), where q - .46 and
B 	i 
	, if P
-p) (1 +i)T - _ 1
Ci t +i T -1
, if p = i
(1 +i)T+t -(1+i)-TiT
(Details of derivatives of B available from the author upon request.)
u Based on the formula:
P	 X)4 I +
( 1 + i)T - 1
(Details of derivatives of P available from the author upon request.)
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12% would pay 21.2 cents for a five-year lease per dollar of assets in the five-
year recovery class; this figure would be 20.5 cents if the lessor had a discount
rate of 6.48% . 154 A fully worked out example of one of these transactions ap-
pears in Table 8, for a five-year lease of a five-year asset and a 12% discount
rate.i 55
Table 8
A Sample Leasing Transaction
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Purchase 100.00 0 0 0 0 0
2. Loan. 78.85 0 0 0 0 0
3. Loan
Repayments 0 12.42 13.90 15.57 17.43 19.53
4. Loan Balance 78.85 66.43 52.53 36.96 19.53 0
5. Interest
Payments 0 9.45 7.97 6.30 4.44 2.34
6. Lease
Receipts 0 21.87 21.87 21.87 21.87 21.87
7. Depreciation
Allowances 15 22 21 21 21 0
8. Investment
Credit 10 0 0 0 0 0
9. Tax 156 - 16.90 - 4.41 - 3.27 - 2.50 - 1.64 8.98
10. Cash Flow 157 - 4.25 4.41 3.27 2.50 1.64 -8.98
Present Value (discounted at 12 percent) = .02 dollars
If a fully taxable firm leased an asset from one in similar circumstances,
the tax effects of such a transaction would cancel, with respect to both the ITC
and depreciation deductions and the taxes on lease payments net of interest
payments. Should the lessee be a Type I firm with no taxable income in the
year of the lease but taxable income thereafter, the lease will allow the full tax
benefits of ACRS to be obtained, but the taxes on lease payments net of in-
terest payments in future years would still cancel. Thus, the lessee would be
enabled to gain a position similar to the fully-taxable firm. If, however, the
lessee is a non-taxable Type II firm, a different result obtains. The Type II
firm gets the full value of the asset's depreciation deductions and investment
"4 The value of 6.48% is chosen for the example because it would be the after-tax dis-
count for a firm borrowing at 12%.
155 For another example, see Sheffrin, The Simple Economics of the Liberalized Leasing Provi-
sions, 10, University of California-Davis (1981).
156 Tax - .46 x (6-5-7) - 8.
137 Cash Flow	 (2 - 1) + (6-4-5) - 9 - 2-1-9
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tax credit but pays no taxes on the income the asset generates."s This appears
to place it in a favored position relative to the other firms.
There are, however, two extenuating factors. First, the non-taxable lessee
cannot take advantage of the deductions of lease payments made net of interest
received from the lessor, while the lessor must include the difference in income.
Thus, the lessee receives only the initial "down payment" on his loan to the
lessor in exchange for his ACRS benefits. Naturally, two firms in this situation
might attempt to mitigate this effect by lengthening the term of the lease
substantially, and in so doing make the loan repayments smaller. Under the
safe harbor provisions, however, the term of a lease cannot exceed the greater
of 150% of the asset's ADR midpoint life and 90% of its "useful life" as de-
fined under section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code. "9 In addition, to the ex-
tent that the Type II firm finances its investment with borrowing of its own, it
currently cannot deduct the interest payments while a firm with taxable profits
can take such interest deductions.' 6° Together, these two factors will probably
not give the advantage to the taxable firm, but they will lessen the disadvantage
from which it suffers relative to the non-taxable firm.
Of course, the real difference between such a sale-leaseback agreement
and the outright sale of credits and deductions is the risk undertaken by the
lessor that the lessee will enter bankruptcy. What the position of the lessor
would be in such a case is beyond the scope of this article.
CONCLUSIONS
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System and related business incentive
provisions included in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduces greatly
the tax burden on business investment in the U.S. undertaken after January 1,
1981, to the extentthat it will largely offset the corporation income tax in future
years. Its effects are quite different, however, from those that would obtain on
the simple abolition of the corporate income tax. Instead of merely being zero,
the effective corporate tax rate under ERTA will vary widely across assets and
will be negative for many. In addition, the opportunity to deduct interest
payments will make the effective tax rates on debt-financed investments still
lower.
Corporate tax collections, however, will not be eliminated entirely.
Rather, the fact that many firms will continue — at least for a time — to derive
a large portion of their income from sources other than depreciable personal
property purchased after January 1, 1981, will keep the revenues positive.
Those firms not deriving income from these sources will be able to sell part of
their losses to those that are — through safe-harbor leasing provisions accom-
"9
 By our hypothesis, a Type II firm will have losses which will negate any income
generated by the asset throughout the foreseeable future.
"9 See supra note 73.
' 6° See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976).
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panying ACRS. Thus, the smallness of corporate tax collections will mask
what is happening: some investments, being taxed effectively at substantially
negative rates, being used to shelter others that face positive tax rates.
Regardless of whether reductions in capital income taxes were in general a
good idea, ACRS appears to have accomplished this objective in a rather com-
plicated and distortionary way. Further analysis will be necessary to say
whether this conclusion is altered by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982.
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